Billions of non-human animals experience violence, cruelty and abuse at the hands of human-made systems. Speciesism - the oppression of non-human animals on the basis of their species membership - places almost all human interests above the interests of non-human animals. As a result, they are seen, traded and used as resources, and their natural habitats receive little or no protection. Globalisation has contributed to the international spread of speciesist practices. More non-human animals than ever before are directly or indirectly harmed by global cooperative systems. This raises new questions for animal ethics:

• How do global institutions or economic systems affect non-human animals?
• Can non-human animals be included in theories of global justice?

Many cosmopolitan approaches seek to establish global obligations to help resolve international injustices. But almost all of them focus exclusively on global obligations towards humans. Why is this? Relational cosmopolitanism, for example, grounds principles of justice not in inherent human capacities (such as rationality) but in shared political, economic and social institutions, associations and relationships. Since non-human animals also have certain relationships with global institutions and associations, it is necessary to examine the extent to which they too can be recipients of principles of global justice. In what follows, I will present the main principles of relational cosmopolitanism and apply them to non-human animals. I will argue that a.) transnational relations reproduce speciesist structures and institutions on a global scale and consequently b.) non-human animals stand in the right justice-generating global relations.

Part One: Relational Cosmopolitanism

Cosmopolitan theories are characterized by the idea that moral obligations and principles of justice do not limit themselves to nation-state borders. Global networks of relationships and economic interdependence have caused or contributed to changes in social relations in many regions of the world. These changes may lead to a shift in our understanding of the scope of moral obligations.¹ Relational cosmopolitan approaches ground justice in shared political, economic, or social associations and relations. They thus have a practical reference; there must be certain relations and relationships in the world that are justice-apt.²

Relational approaches, however, need not lead to an international theory of justice. Representatives of nationalist theories might argue that the relations that give rise to justice exist only within a geographically limited area - such as within a nation or a union - but not at the global level.³ According to nationalists, the relevant relations for the emergence of principles of justice are based on the agreement of rational and moral agents to give up liberties in order to obtain securities. Since fellow citizens of a state must give up their liberties in equal measure, they have more obligations to themselves than to citizens of other nations.⁴ In this understanding of relational justice, relations of reciprocity promote justice and ensure the distribution of goods.

It is now important to analyse how proponents of relational cosmopolitanism justify the extension of principles of justice beyond national borders. Thomas Pogge's strategy is to show that we accept sets of principles at the national level which, if applied consistently, must also apply globally. A principle such as "as far as is reasonably possible, an economic order must be structured in such a way as to guarantee a distribution of goods that meets the basic needs of its participants" is accepted by most people as a guiding principle within a state.⁵ If an economic system possesses the capacity to fulfill the fundamental needs of its citizens but falls short due to a privileged minority's inclination to amass wealth, it can be deemed inherently unjust. This description arises from our firm belief that institutions should be held accountable when they disregard the fundamental rights of individuals.

Pogge now argues that there are two criteria that need to be assessed in order to judge whether an institution is responsible for a social injustice. He uses poverty as an example. The first criterion is evaluative: One must ask to what extent institutional changes would be able to prevent poverty. If reforms are possible but not willingly implemented, this constitutes an injustice. The second criterion is causal: It assesses whether the institution is causally responsible for poverty. If this is the case, there is an obligation to correct the unjust situation. In a next step, Pogge tries to show, on the basis of the criteria listed above, that the evaluation of global cooperative systems and institutions would lead to the conclusion that global institutions are causally responsible for many of the world's deficiencies and that sufficient resources are available to guarantee an equal distribution.⁶ In the following section, this argument will be explained in more detail.

Relational Cosmopolitanism: Global interdependence as justice-generating relations. The example of commodity trade

Both Charles Beitz and Pogge identify capitalism and the growth of international investment and trade as one of the main causes of global interdependence between states, which seriously affects the lives of individuals. The need to extend the principles of justice to the global level lies in the fact that international interdependence and the global system of cooperation contribute to and reinforce many global injustices.¹ This can be illustrated by the widespread phenomenon of international relocation of production. A notable example is that of large corporations and companies that choose not to invest in domestic production and distribution facilities. Instead, they strategically position themselves in locations where the market offers optimal economic conditions for their products, often investing in foreign production facilities that enable low-cost production through the use of cheap labour.⁷

Switzerland, for example, is one of the world's largest commodity traders and the world's most important commodity trading centre, even though the resources traded do not originate in resource-poor Switzerland, nor do they physically pass through the country.⁸ Companies involved in the trade of natural resources make billions of dollars in profits each year. However, they are repeatedly accused of exploiting unstable national conditions in resource-rich countries, thereby contributing to poverty, human rights abuses and environmental degradation and pollution.⁹ A striking observation is that many countries rich in natural resources often have alarmingly high poverty rates. The United Nations stresses that this discrepancy, which involves a stark contrast between abundant resources and a diminished quality of life, cannot be attributed solely to corruption or inadequate legislation within the countries concerned. Rather, it is largely due to the behaviour of various investors who take advantage of the vulnerability of poorer states or individuals.¹⁰

An example may help to illustrate this: In the wake of the 1990s commodity crisis, mining was privatised under pressure from the World Bank and the IMF, allowing multinational corporations to buy up resource-rich mines abroad. But the profits from mining were not reinvested in the poorer countries where the mines were located, but transferred to richer countries.[^Neuhaus] This situation is due to the disadvantaged position of many impoverished nations, historically affected by colonialism and its lingering effects. These countries are in an unfavourable negotiating position, mainly because of their financial dependence on the industrialised countries or global institutions such as the World Bank. Consequently, this dependence has allowed the industrialised countries to secure advantageous economic positions in the global market. An example of this is the imposition of economic guidelines on former colonial states that enable them to obtain loans from the World Bank.¹¹

Global dependencies have contributed to the exacerbation of global poverty through international agreements and economic cooperation. Pogge argues that global institutions and industrialised nations have the capacity to ensure a fair distribution of goods, but fail to do so because they benefit from unbalanced international power relations. Furthermore, these examples show that corrupt or unstable governments of poorer countries cannot be held entirely responsible for poverty, as global historical and economic factors all contribute to it.¹² Wealthy nations are thus major factors in creating and perpetuating global poverty: "[they] are imposing a global institutional order that foreseeably and avoidably reproduces severe and wide-spread poverty".¹³

Pogge and Beitz offer a more precise understanding of the relationships that promote justice. In particular, the criterion of reciprocity becomes less important. There are a number of factors that make relations based on consent and reciprocity significantly different at the global level from those within nation-states. The "global world order" lacks overarching institutions that have the same functions and forms of coercion as domestic institutions. Even the largest global institutions, such as the UN, the WTO or the IMF, do not encompass all of the world's states.¹⁴ Representatives of a cosmopolitan relational approach are aware of this as well.¹⁵ Charles Beitz, for example, tries to define the relevant relations using the concept of "international interconnectedness": "there is an array of processes and institutions through which states and other political actors attempt to influence one another which, directly or indirectly, affect the prospects of the persons which live within their scope."¹⁶ The relevant relationships need to extend state borders because not only institutions but also global processes shape people's lives in a relevant sense.¹⁷

From this, two theses can be derived that are integral to relational cosmopolitan theories:

Thesis I: Justice-generating relations derive from economic, social, and political dependencies and relationships that individuals share with one another and that affect their lives.¹⁸

Thesis II: States and multinational corporations bear primary responsibility to restore global justice, while individuals are recipients of justice principles.

Part 2. Relational cosmopolitanism and the question of global justice for non-human animals

Non-human animals are entities of moral concern - they can suffer, have intentional states, form friendships and take care of their own lives. Non-human animals, unlike material objects, share with humans many capacities that are relevant to moral consideration.²⁰ That non-human animals are of moral concern does not tell us anything about the extent to which they are recipients of principles of justice in relational cosmopolitan conceptions. However, the observation is important in showing that our relation to non-human animals is different from that to non-sentient objects, in that the phenomenal states of non-human animals depend on external factors. This serves as a starting point for the following considerations.

The lives of many non-human animals are seriously affected by global economic and political institutions and relationships.

Principles of justice often consider only humans. In relational theories, this is usually due to the criterion of reciprocity. Since non-human animals are not moral agents - that is, they cannot recognise and fulfil moral duties - they cannot participate in a particular kind of reciprocal social cooperation. But this is not necessary in order to obtain justice; rather, as has been shown, it is those relationships that are capable of influencing the lives of individuals to a great extent that produce justice. The following section explores this in more detail.

First and foremost, domesticated non-human animals are part of a cooperative system, as they were probably all brought into the world with the intention of cooperating with and providing services to humans. Billions of "farm animals" have their flesh, skin or body fluids extracted for human consumption. Non-human animals are used for experiments that (supposedly) lead to medical advances that benefit humans. "Pets" are most visibly integrated into human communities, taking on the role of companions. Many dogs, for example, are also forced into professions - as companions for the blind, as guard dogs, for the police or in the military.²¹

Cooperation with non-human animals is in the vast majority of cases unilateral, coercive and not based on their consent and voluntariness. As they lack the capacity for reciprocity, they cannot negotiate these terms. However, this cannot be a criterion for excluding non-human animals from global relational principles of justice. In a global theory of justice, the relations that create justice cannot be based exclusively on reciprocity, since many humans are unable to participate in political processes but are dependent on assistance. Pogge and Beitz identify the injustice of the global economic order precisely in the fact that the people affected by it have no opportunity to consent to or influence global processes.²²

Similarly, non-human animals cannot choose whether they want to be kept in factory farms or exist solely to serve human purposes - but we have good reason to believe that they would avoid these conditions if given the chance. If Pogge and Beitz argue that at the international level the primary responsibility for improving institutional arrangements lies with states, because individuals are incapable of influencing unjust global orders, but they are supposed to be the recipients of these improvements, then the question arises as to why non-human animals cannot also be recipients of justice, since they too suffer from being in relation to us and are powerless in the face of the imposition of certain orders.

This means that if justice-creating global relations have the potential to make the lives of individuals worse or better, sometimes significantly, then non-human animals can also be included, since their exploitation, and that of the resources and habitats on which they depend, is directly related to their well-being and the quality of their lives. In the following, I will give a small selection of examples of how global institutions and relationships negatively affect the lives of non-human animals.

Human-Animal Relations: The globalization of speciesism and the consequences for non-human animals

The global demand for the consumption of animal products and by-products serves as an underlying driver of speciesism, which perpetuates the oppression of non-human animals based on their membership of a particular species. This system of speciesism permeates various global systems and institutions. The process of globalisation and economic interdependence has further fuelled the belief that non-human animals are inherently inferior to humans, making them exploitable in almost every way. The global distribution of resources has significant implications for countless non-human animals. Firstly, they themselves are seen as mere resources, and their living conditions are subject to the pressures of profit and production. Secondly, human-induced global problems such as climate change or deforestation have a profound impact on the well-being of many non-human animals living in the wild. Several examples can shed light on this complex interplay:

ASince the early stages of colonialism, indigenous communities that relied on hunting or killing non-human animals for sustenance were compelled to relinquish their lands to white settlers. These appropriated territories were subsequently repurposed by settlers to establish slaughterhouses, breeding farms, and zoos, which were unfamiliar to the indigenous populations. The restructuring of the land under the settlers' control, particularly for agricultural purposes, aimed to maximize profits and enhance the profitability of exploiting non-human animals beyond the boundaries of the settler states:²³: "Anthropocentrism is […] a politics of space whereby land is commodified and privatized for animal agriculture".²⁴ These trends persisted beyond the colonial era and continued to shape global dynamics. An example of this can be seen after the Second World War when surplus and subsidized animal-based food products from the United States were shipped to developing nations as part of international aid initiatives. This practice had significant implications as it not only altered the dietary patterns of local populations but also posed a threat to local food producers by introducing competition. Furthermore, the rise of industrialized and intensive methods of animal farming and slaughter, which were previously non-existent, led to the creation of new markets.²⁵ The US encouraged these events in order to continue selling its grain to poorer countries. The consequences were not only the exploitation of non-human animals, but also the increased dependence of the affected countries on US grain supplies: "Thus, non-human animals have become increasingly integral to much of the global economy as part of Western cultural expansion and deliberate food dependency."²⁶

In addition, the lack of global institutions dedicated to protecting the interests of non-human animals exacerbates the situation. The World Trade Organisation (WTO), which regulates global trade rules, has repeatedly been criticised for impeding progressive changes in national animal welfare legislation. While the WTO allows member countries to ban "cruel farming practices" on their own territory and to implement improved conditions for non-human animals domestically, it prohibits bans on imports derived from such rejected cruel practices. For example, this has resulted in the European Union (EU) failing to enforce planned reforms to improve the welfare of broiler chickens. The EU was concerned that these reforms would lead to increased costs for local farmers, while cheap producers from outside the EU would gain ground, potentially making the production of animal flesh by member state farmers unprofitable.²⁷ Another global institution, the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE), has some regulations on the farming of non-human animals killed for their flesh, but they are so vague and limited that almost all existing practices are approved.²⁸

NNot only has the trade in non-human animal flesh accelerated as a result of globalisation, but many free-living non-human animals are affected by human-made systems. This too is reflected in global structures - and global institutions are unable to achieve significant international change. For example, CITES, the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, is an international trade commission that aims to regulate plant and animal populations and their trade.²⁹ Norway takes a leadership position in CITES, donating 40% of globally invested funding to protect rainforests, which then goes to countries such as Brazil or Colombia.³⁰ While Norway supports the conservation of tigers and elephants in countries in the global South, it is repeatedly criticised for failing to uphold species protection within its own borders and for failing to stop the hunting of endangered gray wolves and the killing of whales.³¹ CITES has also recognised this fact and fined Norway, but the fine was so small that it did not create any pressure to ensure the protection of free-living non-human animals. Norway's intention to present itself globally as a protector of animals and biodiversity has other reasons, namely to shield the country from international criticism of its own oil industry, which has a significant impact on climate change and the suffering of non-human animals: "Norway’s actions represent neo-colonialism in seeking to influence the environmental politics of Southern countries in the pursuit of national interests".³² In addition, Norway is an investor of Brazil's largest meat producer JBS - the main culprit for deforestation of the local rainforest.³³

These examples show that international agreements such as CITES do not have sufficient power to hold parties to the agreement accountable, nor can they guarantee that parties will not invest in companies or sectors that are part of the problem they are supposed to address. But even if international agreements or institutions could force an improvement in the living conditions of exploited non-human animals, this would still mean that they are seen as economic assets and their interests are not protected for their own sake. The WTO, OIE and CITES are speciesist institutions whose laws or regulations are not designed to represent the interests of all non-human animals, but to profit from their exploitation or to favour only certain non-human animals. Lax and speciesist international animal welfare laws are part of the problem because they reproduce and legitimise the oppression of non-human animals worldwide.

Human-Animal Relations: Intersecting injustices

The globalization of the exploitation of non-human animals not only perpetuates injustices against them but also has implications for human injustices. Pogge highlights the predicament that people primarily residing in the global "West" contribute to an asymmetry of ownership. This disparity is evident in our current food system, which exhibits an inefficient distribution of resources, leading to devastating consequences for both humans and non-human animals. A telling example of this inefficiency is the fact that approximately half of the world's grain harvest is allocated to feed non-human animals.³⁴ TTwo-thirds of all "farm animals" killed for human consumption are raised on factory farms, where they rely on concentrated feed, much of which is made from soy. From 2000 to 2016, the international soy market nearly doubled, driven by China's growing demand for animal "products".³⁵ Soy is mainly grown in poorer countries - one of the main reasons for the deforestation of Brazil, which not only leaves many non-human animals homeless or dead, but has also led to numerous conflicts between indigenous communities and multinational companies.³⁶

The consequences of deforestation, pollution and climate change, for which industrial animal agriculture is partly responsible, are felt most keenly by the world's poorest people - and by non-human animals. "Western" countries in particular lead the way in per capita consumption of meat and dairy products, but this trend is becoming increasingly globalised - as developments in China show.³⁷ The inadequate protection of natural habitats, the unsustainable cultivation of crops and the welfare of exploited non-human animals also receive minimal attention from international institutions. This is partly because the soy trade is a lucrative business for breeders in industrialised countries, and partly because Brazil sees soy cultivation as a way of achieving domestic progress.³⁸ Due to the different places of production and distribution, there is no uniform regulation. The WHO, the World Bank and other institutions contribute to the problem by regulating the world market less instead of more, thus "[…] only strengthen the corporate status quo controlling the world’s food" and thus also controlling the lives of sentient non-humans and humans suffering from hunger.³⁹

There are parallels between the suffering of non-human animals and humans, especially when it comes to the global distribution of food. Non-human animals are subjected to violence and torture because their bodies and lives are seen as mere commodities. They are bred to perform better, which in turn causes them physical harm. Historical events and international trade relations have accelerated the global exploitation of non-human animals by making their breeding and trade a lucrative business that is both tolerated and even protected by global institutions. At the same time, the "globalisation of meat consumption" is one of the greatest obstacles to tackling extreme poverty, hunger and human-induced climate change.⁴⁰ This creates a complex web of global relationships from which some nations and corporations benefit financially, but which makes non-human animals and many humans even more vulnerable.

Results: The speciesist double standard

These empirical data allow us to conclude that global developments - especially economic ones - have a significant impact on non-human animals. Since there is a clear link between the dark fate of many non-human individuals and global institutions and systems, they too must be protected by principles of justice. We have sufficient capacity to ensure a fair distribution of resources to non-human animals as well; by not breeding and using them as resources ourselves, and by respecting their natural habitats. It is therefore unclear to what extent relational cosmopolitanism should not also call for institutional arrangements that protect the interests of non-human animals. If relational theories define social cooperation and interconnectedness as a relevant criterion for the scope of principles of justice, and yet these are neutral towards structures and institutions that affect the lives of non-human animals, this too seems to constitute a double standard.

Pogge's charge of double standards concerns the imposition of moral principles on national, but not global, institutions, with the result of "[…] arbitrary discrimination in favor of affluent societies and against the global poor".⁴¹ One explanation for such discrimination is that economic injustice is condemned more harshly at the national level than at the global level. But this is not enough to defend a territorially limited theory of relations. Pogge suggests that the burden of proof is on those who advocate double standards: "we owe the global poor an account of why we take ourselves to be entitled to impose upon them a global economic order in violation of the minimal moral constraints we ourselves place on the imposition of any national economic order."⁴²

The promotion of economic inequalities by global structures and institutions raises an important question: why are we not obligated to assist those who have been pushed into poverty? Pogge contends that when confronted with such a profound and widespread injustice, we cannot provide a satisfactory explanation without relying on arbitrary factors, such as national borders, to determine who deserves moral consideration.⁴²

A similar double standard becomes evident when non-human animals are excluded from global theories of justice simply because they are not human. Non-human animals, like humans suffering from severe poverty, represent some of the most vulnerable beings in our world. Their well-being is profoundly intertwined with human activities, both at national and global levels. However, they face exceptional vulnerability due to the lack of comprehensive laws, whether national or global, that genuinely prioritize their interests. Embracing a relational cosmopolitan theory means acknowledging that interconnectedness generates moral obligations for those capable of shaping global processes. Therefore, why should non-human animals not also be regarded as individuals to whom states bear obligations?

Pogge's two criteria for assessing global injustice also apply in the case of non-human animals. The exploitation of non-human animals is avoidable given the double burden it imposes: individual animals are instrumentalised and their rights violated, while the environment suffers from pollution and waste of resources. A more equitable distribution of food would probably be facilitated by the direct and efficient use of food and grain. It is paradoxical, however, that the regions where a plant-based diet would be most accessible consume the highest amounts of animal flesh. Furthermore, the destruction of non-human animal habitats and the depletion of resources is also avoidable. The causality criterion is also met. While speciesism, like poverty, finds expression in national institutions, it is reinforced, propagated or consolidated by global structures. The expansion of industrial agriculture corresponds to the global demand for cheap animal products. Industrialised countries seek new markets for meat and dairy products in order to optimise their production chains, thereby creating international dependencies. In addition, international institutions often fail to act consistently to protect non-human animals in their natural habitats, as in the case of CITES.

It seems a double standard if the morally relevant interconnectedness cannot extend beyond the human species. As shown in the previous sections, billions of sentient non-human animals experience confinement, torture, loss of home and family, and their own premature deaths precisely because they are in some way related to humans. To exclude them simply because they are not human or cannot fulfil obligations would be to arbitrarily discriminate against all sufficiently sentient non-humans - in favour of humans, corporations and states who profit from owning and exploiting their lives. Analogous to Pogge's example of poverty, the burden of proof can be placed on relational cosmopolitan theories that seek to exempt non-human animals from justice. We owe non-human animals an explanation of why we feel justified in imposing on them a global economic order that violates the minimal moral constraints we would impose on us humans.